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On November 23, 1999, I received a one-page fax from Bruce
Cort that appended a Washington Post article describing an
aborted buyout of CORT Business Services. Despite his name,
Bruce has no connection with CORT. Rather, he is an airplane
broker who had sold Berkshire a jet in 1986 and who, before the
fax, had not been in touch with me for about ten years.
1999年11月23號我收到由Bruce Cort署名的傳真,後附一篇刊登在
華盛頓郵報有關CORT商業服務公司標購失敗的新聞,事實上,除了名
字巧合之外,Bruce Cort與CORT公司完全沒有關係,這位先生是一位
中古飛機仲介商,巧合的是,他本人還曾經在1986年賣過一架飛機給
Berkshire,在這張傳真之前,我已經有十年沒有跟他有過任何接觸。
I knew nothing about CORT, but I immediately printed out its SEC
filings and liked what I saw. That same day I told Bruce I had a
possible interest and asked him to arrange a meeting with Paul
Arnold, CORT’s CEO. Paul and I got together on November 29,
and I knew at once that we had the right ingredients for a
purchase: a fine though unglamorous business, an outstanding
manager, and a price (going by that on the failed deal) that made
sense.
在此之前,我對CORT公司一無所知,但我馬上調出該公司向證管會申
報的文件,一看之下大喜過望,就在當天,我向Bruce表示我對該公司
很有興趣,並請他立即幫我安排與該公司總裁Paul Arnold會面,不久後
Paul跟我在11月29號碰面,當下我就知道我們很有可能會成交,那是
一家樸實無華的好公司,同時價格也合理(當然多多少少受到先前流標的
影響)。
Operating out of 117 showrooms, CORT is the national leader in
"rent-to-rent" furniture, primarily used in offices but also by
temporary occupants of apartments. This business, it should be
noted, has no similarity to "rent-to-own" operations, which
usually involve the sale of home furnishings and electronics to
people having limited income and poor credit.
擁有117個外部展示點,CORT是全美辦公室傢具出租(也有臨時公寓使
用者)的領導品牌,必須說明一點,這個行業與分期付款租賃並不相同,
後者通常將目標鎖定在推銷電子產品及傢具,給經濟能力有限且信用記錄
不佳客戶者。
We quickly purchased CORT for Wesco, our 80%-owned
subsidiary, paying about $386 million in cash. You will find more
details about CORT’s operations in Wesco’s 1999 and 2000
annual reports. Both Charlie and I enjoy working with Paul, and
CORT looks like a good bet to beat our original expectations.
我們很快地透過持有80%股權的子公司Wesco名義以3.86億美元的現
金買下CORT,大家可以在Wesco 1999年及2000年的年報中找到更
多有關CORT的訊息,查理跟我都很喜歡與Paul一起共事,而CORT的
表現更超乎我們的預期,我們算是押對寶了。
Early last year, Ron Ferguson of General Re put me in contact with
Bob Berry, whose family had owned U.S. Liability for 49 years. This
insurer, along with two sister companies, is a medium-sized,
highly-respected writer of unusual risks - "excess and surplus
lines" in insurance jargon. After Bob and I got in touch, we agreed
by phone on a half-stock, half-cash deal.
去年初,通用再保的董事長Ron Ferguson幫我聯絡上Bob Berry,其家
族49年來一直擁有美國責任險公司,這家保險公司,加上其他兩家姊妹
公司都是屬於中小型、聲譽卓著的特殊險保險公司,套句保險業界的行
話,那是好又多的業務,而Bob在與我接觸之後,也同意以一半股票,
一半現金的方式進行交易。
In recent years, Tom Nerney has managed the operation for the
Berry family and has achieved a rare combination of excellent
growth and unusual profitability. Tom is a powerhouse in other
ways as well. In addition to having four adopted children (two
from Russia), he has an extended family: the Philadelphia Belles, a
young-teen girls basketball team that Tom coaches. The team
had a 62-4 record last year and finished second in the AAU
national tournament.
近幾年來,都是由Tom Nerney為Berry家族經營這家公司,不論是成
長速度或是獲利能力的表現都相當突出,Tom本身更是精力充沛,不但
親自認養四名小孩(其中有兩個來自俄國),他本身還擔任教練帶領一支來
自費城的青少女籃球隊,這隻球隊去年擁有62勝4敗的輝煌戰績,並在
AAU全國錦標賽中奪得亞軍。
Few property-casualty companies are outstanding businesses.
We have far more than our share, and U.S. Liability adds luster to
the collection.
好的產物意外險公司本來就不多,但我們卻擁有不少,這超過我們應得之
份,美國責任險公司的加入,無異為我們更增添輝煌。
Ben Bridge Jeweler was another purchase we made by phone,
prior to any face-to-face meeting between me and the
management. Ed Bridge, who with his cousin, Jon, manages this
65-store West Coast retailer, is a friend of Barnett Helzberg, from
whom we bought Helzberg Diamonds in 1995. Upon learning that
the Bridge family proposed to sell its company, Barnett gave
Berkshire a strong recommendation. Ed then called and explained
his business to me, also sending some figures, and we made a
deal, again half for cash and half for stock.
Ben Bridge珠寶公司是另外一件靠電話成交的個案,在這之前我們雙方
連面對面談話都沒有,Ed Bridge是Barnett Helzberg的好朋友,1995
年我們向Barnett買下賀茲柏格珠寶,Ed跟他的姪子Jon共同經營這家
位於西岸擁有65家分店的珠寶公司,在聽到Bridge有意出售公司之後,
Barnett立刻強烈建議Berkshire買進,於是Ed打電話向我說明公司營
運的狀況,同時送了一些報表資料過來,然後雙方就此成交,這次一樣是
一半現金,一半股票。
Ed and Jon are fourth generation owner-managers of a business
started 89 years ago in Seattle. Both the business and the family -
including Herb and Bob, the fathers of Jon and Ed - enjoy
extraordinary reputations. Same-store sales have increased by
9%, 11%, 13%, 10%, 12%, 21% and 7% over the past seven years, a
truly remarkable record.
早從89年前,該公司在西雅圖創立之後,到現在Ed與Jon已經是第四
代了,經營成員還包括Herb及Bob,他們分別是Jon與Ed的父親,在
當地享有盛譽,過去七年來,該公司的營業額分別成長了9%、11%、13%、
10%、12%、21%及7%,這個記錄真是驚人。
It was vital to the family that the company operate in the future as
in the past. No one wanted another jewelry chain to come in and
decimate the organization with ideas about synergy and cost
saving (which, though they would never work, were certain to be
tried). I told Ed and Jon that they would be in charge, and they
knew I could be believed: After all, it’s obvious that your
Chairman would be a disaster at actually running a store or selling
jewelry (though there are members of his family who have earned
black belts as purchasers).
對於該家族而言,公司的運作能否一如往常,至關重要,沒有人願意坐視
其他珠寶連鎖商趁虛而入,或是因為提出綜效及降低成本等餿主意讓公司
營運走下坡(雖然大家可以預知這一點效果都不會有,但還是一定會被要
求試看看),然而我卻明確告知仍由Ed及Jon負全責,他們也知道我說話
算話,畢竟本人還有自知之明,要我負責經營一家珠寶專賣店,鐵定會是
一場災難,雖然我的家人買珠寶買到可以獲頒黑帶的榮銜。
In their typically classy way, the Bridges allocated a substantial
portion of the proceeds from their sale to the hundreds of co-
workers who had helped the company achieve its success. We’re
proud to be associated with both the family and the company.
令人敬佩的是,Bridges家族將出售事業的所得,與協助公司成功的數百
位員工一起分享,我們很榮幸可以與這樣的家族及公司建立關係。
In July we acquired Justin Industries, the leading maker of Western
boots - including the Justin, Tony Lama, Nocona, and Chippewa
brands - and the premier producer of brick in Texas and five
neighboring states.
同年七月,我們買下西式靴子的領導廠商Justin企業,旗下品牌包含
Justin、Tony Lama、Nocona及Chippewa,同時他們也是德州以及鄰
近五州磚塊的主要製造商。
Here again, our acquisition involved serendipity. On May 4th, I
received a fax from Mark Jones, a stranger to me, proposing that
Berkshire join a group to acquire an unnamed company. I faxed
him back, explaining that with rare exceptions we don’t invest
with others, but would happily pay him a commission if he sent
details and we later made a purchase. He replied that the "mystery
company" was Justin. I then went to Fort Worth to meet John
Roach, chairman of the company and John Justin, who had built
the business and was its major shareholder. Soon after, we
bought Justin for $570 million in cash.
再一次我們的購併之旅充滿了驚奇,5月4號我收到一位署名Mark Jones
的傳真,我根本就不認識這個人,他提議Berkshire可以參與購併一家不
知名的公司,我回傳真給他,表示除非是特例,否則我們很少跟別人一起
參與投資,不過要是他肯把資料送給我們參考,事後若購併成功,我們願
意支付他一筆介紹費,他回覆說這家神祕公司叫做Justin,於是我便到
Fort Worth與該公司董事長-John Roach及創辦人兼大股東John Justin
會面,不久之後,我們順利以5.7億美元的現金買下Justin公司。
John Justin loved Justin Industries but had been forced to retire
because of severe health problems (which sadly led to his death in
late February). John was a class act - as a citizen, businessman
and human being. Fortunately, he had groomed two outstanding
managers, Harrold Melton at Acme and Randy Watson at Justin
Boot, each of whom runs his company autonomously.
John非常熱愛Justin企業,但卻由於健康問題不得不自公司退休,(後來
他更不幸在隔年二月去世),John是位優秀的市民、企業家以及人士,所
幸他還網羅了兩位傑出的經理人-Acme磚塊的Harrold以及Justin靴子
的Randy,兩人各自獨立經營這兩家事業。
Acme, the larger of the two operations, produces more than one
billion bricks per year at its 22 plants, about 11.7% of the
industry’s national output. The brick business, however, is
necessarily regional, and in its territory Acme enjoys
unquestioned leadership. When Texans are asked to name a
brand of brick, 75% respond Acme, compared to 16% for the
runner-up. (Before our purchase, I couldn’t have named a brand
of brick. Could you have?) This brand recognition is not only due
to Acme’s product quality, but also reflects many decades of
extraordinary community service by both the company and John
Justin.
Acme的規模稍大,22座工廠每年生產出超過10億個磚塊,大約佔全
美磚塊總產出的11.7%,磚塊產業有其區域性限制,在其經營的區域,
Acme享有獨霸的地位,當德州佬被問到知名磚塊的品牌時,75%的人會
想到Acme,遠遠超越第二位的16%,(很遺憾在買下這家公司之前,我
竟連一個磚塊品牌都不知道,不知道各位能不能? )這種品牌的認同度不僅
僅歸功於Acme的產品品質,更深深地反映出該公司幾十年來深耕地方
服務的成果。
I can’t resist pointing out that Berkshire - whose top management
has long been mired in the 19th century - is now one of the very
few authentic "clicks-and-bricks" businesses around. We went
into 2000 with GEICO doing significant business on the Internet,
and then we added Acme. You can bet this move by Berkshire is
making them sweat in Silicon Valley.
而我也忍不住要指出Berkshire的經營階層還老頑固地深陷在19世紀當
中,如今又多了一項道地實在的產業,另一方面進入2000年,我們旗下
的GEICO也經由網路做生意,但是後來我們又增添了Acme,我敢保證
Berkshire的這項舉動將使矽谷的那幫人汗流浹背。
In June, Bob Shaw, CEO of Shaw Industries, the world’s largest
carpet manufacturer, came to see me with his partner, Julian Saul,
and the CEO of a second company with which Shaw was mulling a
merger. The potential partner, however, faced huge asbestos
liabilities from past activities, and any deal depended on these
being eliminated through insurance.
六月,Bob Shaw-Shaw企業的總裁-該公司是全世界最大的地毯製造
商,帶著其夥伴-Julian Saul(同行還有一位正與Shaw企業洽談合併的公
司總裁),一起來見我,後者因為石綿案面臨潛在龐大的訴訟賠償,而合
併交易能否成功要看這些或有負債能否透過保險來解決。
The executives visiting me wanted Berkshire to provide a policy
that would pay all future asbestos costs. I explained that though
we could write an exceptionally large policy - far larger than any
other insurer would ever think of offering - we would never issue
a policy that lacked a cap.
兩位主管拜訪我的目的是希望Berkshire能夠提供他們一張保單以協助
他們解決合併後所有未來潛在的石綿賠償成本,我向他們解釋到雖然我們
可以簽發的保單金額比任何其他保險業者都來得大,但卻不可能發出金額
沒有上限的保單。
Bob and Julian decided that if we didn’t want to bet the ranch on
the extent of the acquiree’s liability, neither did they. So their deal
died. But my interest in Shaw was sparked, and a few months later
Charlie and I met with Bob to work out a purchase by Berkshire. A
key feature of the deal was that both Bob and Julian were to
continue owning at least 5% of Shaw. This leaves us associated
with the best in the business as shown by Bob and Julian’s record:
Each built a large, successful carpet business before joining
forces in 1998.
Bob跟Julian當場決定要是連我們都不敢下重注,賭被購併者潛在的風
險,那麼他們也不幹,雙方的交易最後因此告吹,不過在此同時我對Shaw
企業卻產生濃厚的興趣,幾個月後查理跟我與Bob會面敲定Berkshire
買下該公司的細節,其中有一條相當重要的條款,那就是Bob跟Julian
依然可以繼續持有Shaw企業最少5%的股權,此舉讓我們可以與這個業
界最優秀的經理人一起共事,如同Bob跟Julian過去幾年來輝煌的戰績,
各自在1998年加入我們之前皆已在地毯界建立了規模龐大的成功事
業。
Shaw has annual sales of about $4 billion, and we own 87.3% of
the company. Leaving aside our insurance operation, Shaw is by
far our largest business. Now, if people walk all over us, we won’t
mind.
Shaw的年營業額高達40億美元,而我們則持有該公司87.3%的股權,
除了既有的保險事業營運之外,Shaw成為我們目前最大的事業體,現在
如果現在有人要從我們身上踩過去,我們一點都不會介意。
In July, Bob Mundheim, a director of Benjamin Moore Paint, called
to ask if Berkshire might be interested in acquiring it. I knew Bob
from Salomon, where he was general counsel during some
difficult times, and held him in very high regard. So my answer
was "Tell me more."
七月,Bob Mundheim-Benjamin油漆公司的董事打電話給我,問到
Berkshire是否有興趣買下該公司,我是在所羅門時代認識Bob的,當時
他在該公司最困難的時候提供了許多寶貴的意見,我本人對他相當的敬
重,所以我立即表示:「請繼續說。」
In late August, Charlie and I met with Richard Roob and Yvan
Dupuy, past and present CEOs of Benjamin Moore. We liked them;
we liked the business; and we made a $1 billion cash offer on the
spot. In October, their board approved the transaction, and we
completed it in December. Benjamin Moore has been making
paint for 117 years and has thousands of independent dealers
that are a vital asset to its business. Make sure you specify our
product for your next paint job.
八月底,查理跟我與Richard Roob及Yvan Dupuy碰面,兩人分別是
Benjamin油漆公司前後任的總裁,我們與他們一見如故,也很欣賞這家
公司,當場我們就開出10億現金的條件,到了十月份,該公司董事會通
過這項交易案,而我們則在十二月完成內部手續,Benjamin公司生產油
漆已有117年的歷史,並擁有數千家的獨立經銷商,這也是他們最珍貴
的資產,記得下次買油漆時指名該公司的產品。
Finally, in late December, we agreed to buy Johns Manville Corp.
for about $1.8 billion. This company’s incredible odyssey over the
last few decades - too multifaceted to be chronicled here - was
shaped by its long history as a manufacturer of asbestos
products. The much-publicized health problems that affected
many people exposed to asbestos led to JM’s declaring
bankruptcy in 1982.
最後在十二月底,我們同意以18億美元買下Johns Manville公司(簡稱
JM),這家公司過去幾十年來創造了令人難以置信的傳奇-族煩不及備載,
其中又以生產石綿產品最為著名,當時因為石綿引發許多人致癌的健康問
題而導致該公司在1982年宣佈申請破產。 |
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