|
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION 研制与生产 The development and production of ballistic and cruise missiles in China involves numerous different facilities throughout the nation. These facilities can be seen in the image below: 中国寻访弹道导弹和巡航导弹的研制与生产涉及到遍布全国的不同基地。这些基地如下图所示： 
Missile final assembly is conducted at one of the missile plants or assembly facilities. Solid propellant motors are produced by the facilities near Xian, with the Lantian Solid Rocket Motor Academy being responsible for their design and development. The Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology is responsible for liquid propellant motors, and the marked “Ballistic Missile Development Facility” may be CALT’s main test facility, although this has yet to be verified. TELs are produced by three factories, and may be produced at the Beijing Nanyuan facility as well. 导弹的最终组装在一个导弹工厂或者组装基地进行。固体推进剂发动机由西安附近的基地生产，该基地进行设计研制的机构被称为蓝田固体火箭发动机研究所。中国运载火箭技术研究院负责液态推进发动机的研制，“弹道导弹研发基地”可能是中国运载火箭技术研究院主要的测试基地，但这一点尚未得到证实。运输发射车由三个工厂生产，北京南苑基地也有可能在生产。 NUCLEAR WEAPONS INDUSTRY 核武器工业 Little is known about the actual design and production of Chinese nuclear weapons. Five facilities have been identified that have a known nuclear-related purpose. They are as follows: 外界对于中国核武器设计及生产的准确情况知之甚少。现在只知道有5个地方与核有关。具体如下： -CIAE Nuclear Research Complex, Tuoli -404 Plutonium Production Plant, Jiuquan -504 Uranium Gasseous Diffusion Plant, Lanzhou -821 Plutonium Production Plant, Guangyuan -Lop Nur Nuclear Test Site -中国原子能科学研究院的核能研究所，坨里 -404钚工厂，酒泉 -504铀气态扩散工厂，兰州 -821钚工厂，广元 -罗布泊核试验场 These facilities are annotated on the image below: 上述单位的位置如下图所示： 
While these facilities may have civillian nuclear power and research purposes, their nature indicates that they may also serve the Chinese nuclear weapons industry. Lop Nur is well known as the test site for Chinese nuclear weapons, and the three plants annotated above could be used to produce weapons-grade fissile material. 尽管上述单位可能具有民用核能与研究的目的，但是它们研究对象的本身说明了他们也可能在为中国的核武器工业服务。罗布泊是著名的中国核武器试验场，被标注出来的三个工厂也可以用于生产武器级别的核裂变原料。 OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 作战部署 During wartime, control over the 2nd Artillery Corps’ missile brigades differs as to their payload. Units fielding nuclear armed weapons, most notably the ICBM brigades, report directly to the Chinese national command center west of Beijing. Conventionally armed brigades are treated differently. A regional command cell, called a “war front” command, would assume control of relevant conventionally-armed ballistic missile units as part of a conventional missile corps. This missile corps would be subordinate to the war front command, acting as part of a total force package consisting of air, land, sea, and missile elements. Beijing’s leadership and 2nd Artillery Corps commanders would be able to communicate directly with the war front command, and would retain the ability to directly control assigned missile brigades should the need arise or the situation warrant it. At the brigade level, individual firing battalions would be assigned operating areas consisting of presurveyed and/or prepared launch positions. 在战争期间，二炮部队各个导弹旅的控制管理根据其弹头载荷的类型而有所不同。那些装备核弹头的导弹旅，特别是装备洲际弹道导弹的导弹旅，直接由位于北京西郊的中国国家指挥中心指挥。常规弹头的导弹旅则有所区别。一个相当于传统意义上导弹军的被称为“前指”的区域指挥单元将承担起对常规弹头弹道导弹部队的指挥。这个导弹军将归属于战时前线司令部，这个司令部将统一指挥由陆、海、空及导弹部队组成的武装力量。北京的领导层和二炮指挥官都可以直接与战时前线司令部直接联系，并且也保留了在需要介入或者形势紧急的情况下直接控制指定导弹旅的能力。在导弹旅这个级别上，每个发射营都会被分配由预先测定和/或预先准备好的发射阵地组成的作战区域。 As previously mentioned, it is likely that the garrisoned TELs are not kept uploaded with missiles and armed with warheads. Inside a missile brigade’s force structure, there are six departments: headquarters, political, logistics, technical and equipment, missile storage, and launch battalions. These are present in both conventional and nuclear missile brigades. The missile storage department consists of a central depot, and a missile/warhead transfer section. This implies that there is a storage facility for the missiles and warheads, or perhaps separate facilities for each. No garrison facility possesses the secure, hardened facilities needed to adequately store and protect these assets, so it must be assumed that they are located off-site. The logical assumption is that the vast network of UGFs located near the missile garrisons and launch sites are used to protect, store, and transfer these items. Storing warheads and missiles in UGFs allows TELs to be loaded and armed under protected cover, and away from the prying eyes of intelligence satellites attempting to gauge force readiness. This also allows the garrisons themselves to be situated in or near large population centers, as most of them are, without fear of any accident or incident leading to a catastrophe. 正如前面提到过的，很有可能导弹部队的运输发射车平时是不携带导弹和装载弹头的。对于一个导弹旅的内部组织结构来说，共由6个部门组成：旅指挥部，政治部，后勤部门，技术装备部门，以及导弹存贮部门，发射营。无论是常规导弹旅还是核导弹旅都是如此。导弹存贮部门由一个中心仓库，以及一个导弹/弹头转运部门组成。这意味着导弹和弹头有一个存贮设施，或者可能是分别加以存放。导弹部队的营房没有足够安全、坚固的场所可以用来妥善存贮和保护这些东西，因此，完全可以假定它们位于其它地方。一个理所当然的假设就是，位于导弹部队驻地附近的大量形成网络的地下工事和发射阵地就是用来保护、存贮、以及转运这些东西的。在地下工事存贮弹头和导弹可以让运输发射车在有掩护的情况下进行装载和弹头装配，并且躲过试图监视部队战备状态的侦察卫星的眼睛。这样做还可以把导弹部队安置在人口聚集区或者附近——事实上他们也大多是这样做的，而不用担心因为任何的意外或者事故导致重大灾难。 Apart from the ICBM force, which at present only provides a token deterrent lacking in any sort of credible counterforce or counterstrike capability, the 2nd Artillery Corps is equipped primarily for a regional mission. The most significant unit is the 52nd Base, controlling the weapons directed across the strait at the Taiwan Authority on the island of Taiwan. The twelve units of the 52nd Base control a large number of DF-3A, DF-11, DF-11A, DF-15, and DF-15C ballistic missiles. Apart from the DF-3A which can range far out into the Pacific Ocean, the remaining missile forces have sufficient range to blanket the island of Taiwan without venturing far from their garrisons. 与当前只具备象征性意义的、缺乏对任何波次的进攻进行可靠反击或者突击的洲际弹道导弹部队相比，二炮的装备主要是针对战区任务。其中最为突出的就是52基地，该基地控制着直接针对海峡对面台湾岛上台湾当局的导弹武器。52基地的12支部队装备了大量的东风 -3A、东风-11、东风-11A、东风-15、以及东风-15C型弹道导弹。除了东风-3A的射程可以深入到太平洋以外，其余导弹部队都可以在不需要冒险远离其驻地的情况下有足够的射程对台湾岛进行瞄准。 The following image depicts 2nd Artillery Corps ballistic missile coverage of the island of Taiwan. DF-11 range rings are orange, DF-11A range rings are yellow, and DF-15/DF-15C range rings are red. 下图展示了第二炮兵弹道导弹对台湾岛的覆盖情况。东风-11的射程以橙色圈标示，东风-11A的射程以黄色标示，东风-15/东风-15C的射程则以红色圈表示。 
With a limited ATBM capability provided by Tien Kung II, Tien Kung III, and PATRIOT PAC-2 SAM batteries, the island of Taiwan could easily be oversaturated by incoming weapons, even considering the October 2008 approval by the United States Congress of a PAC-3 sale to the Taiwan Authority. The deployment of accurate, conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles makes the missile threat to the island of Taiwan far more likely to become part of a military option. In short, a determined missile strike on the island of Taiwan can be carried out in a manner guaranteeing its success, should the Chinese government wish to expend the number of weapons necessary to oversaturate the ATBM capable systems. Given the number of missiles deployed by the 52nd Base, it would appear that at least part of that equation has already been satisfied. 由于天弓II型、III型以及爱国者PAC-2地对空导弹营只具备了有限的反战术弹道导弹的能力，即便是在考虑了2008年10月美国国会批准向台湾当局出售PAC-3型爱国者导弹的情况下，台湾岛也可以轻松地被来袭导弹的饱合攻击突破。部署可精确制导、携带常规弹头的弹道导弹和巡航导弹以形成对台湾岛的导弹威胁，正越来越可能成为一个军事选择。简而言之，在可以保证其成功性的前提下对台湾岛实施导弹攻击的决定就有可能被作出，这样一来中国政府就会希望扩充导弹的数量，以形成必要的对反战术弹道导弹系统的饱合攻击能力。考虑到52基地部署的导弹部队的数量，看起来至少对于这种方案中的一部分是认可的。 The most important feature of the 2nd Artillery Corps is mobility. A great deal of effort was made during the 1970s and 1980s to improve mobility and reduce the readiness time of deployed systems. Developmental systems which reached maturity in the 1990s and 2000s were all designed to be highly mobile; a great deal of the successes in this regard have stemmed from the maturation of the solid rocket motor industry. 二炮部队最为重要的一个能力就是机动性。上世纪70年代到80年代二炮部队为了提升机动能力做出了大量的努力，并且减少了部署系统的准备时间。新研制的系统于上世纪90年代到新世纪的头几年间发展成熟，设计上全都考虑了高机动性能；在这一方面所取得的成功，很大程度上要归功于固体火箭发动机工业的发展成熟。 Mobility enhances the survivability of deployed assets, making it harder to accurately target them due to a potential lack of consistently accurate positioning data. The only issue with mobile systems is the need for accurate pretargeting position data to prepare the onboard guidance systems. Using presurveyed and prepared launch sites alleviates a portion of this problem, but provides enemy forces with locations to monitor for deployed missile systems. Adequate intelligence and indications and warning information must also be possessed in order to ensure that missiles are field deployed prior to the outbreak of armed conflict, lest the launchers be destroyed in-garrison before they have a chance to be loaded and deployed. 机动性增强了导弹部署时的生存能力，使其更难以在缺少其精确阵地数据的情况下被准确瞄准。有关机动系统的唯一问题就是需要把预设阵地的准确数据在弹上的制导系统当中准备好。通过预先测定和准备发射阵地，可以部分解决这个问题，但也会让敌军获悉这些地点以监视导弹系统的部署情况。必须保证充分的情报、迹象及预警信息，以便确保导弹部队在武装冲突爆发前进入部署状态，从而避免发射车在有机会装弹和部署之前在驻地被摧毁。 | 
收藏
分享
有用
无用
