契约与组织（英文）
点击下载[此贴子已经被胡涂于2002-12-31 14:25:27编辑过] <P>I like this book,thanks!</P> <p><font face="Verdana">Lectures on Contract Theory<br/>(Preliminary notes. Please do not distribute without permission.)<br/>The contours of contract theory as a field are difficult to define. Many would argue that<br/>contract theory is a subset of Game Theory which is defined by the notion that one party<br/>to the game (typically called the principal) is given all of the bargaining power and so can<br/>make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party or parties (i.e., the agent(s)). In fact, the<br/>techniques for screening contracts were largely developed by pure game theorists to study<br/>allocation mechanisms and game design. But then again, carefully defined, everything is a<br/>subset of game theory.<br/>Others would argue that contract theory is an extension of price theory in the following<br/>sense. Price theory studies how actors interact where the actors are allowed to choose prices,<br/>wages, quantities, etc. and studies partial or general equilibrium outcomes. Contract theory<br/>extends the choice spaces of the actors to include richer strategies (i.e. contracts) rather<br/>than simple one-dimensional choice variables. Hence, a firm can offer a nonlinear price<br/>menu to its customers (i.e., a screening contract) rather than a simple uniform price and an<br/>employer can offer its employee a wage schedule for differing levels of stochastic performance<br/>(i.e., an incentives contract) rather than a simple wage.<br/>Finally, one could group contract theory together by the substantive questions it asks.<br/>How should contracts be developed between principals and their agents to provide correct<br/>incentives for communication of information and actions. Thus, contract theory seeks to<br/>understand organizations, institutions, and relationships between productive individuals<br/>when there are differences in personal objectives (e.g., effort, information revelation, etc.).<br/>It is this later classification that probably best defines contract theory as a eld, although<br/>many interesting questions such as the optimal design of auctions and resource allocation<br/>do not t this description very well but comprise an important part of contract theory<br/>nonetheless.<br/>The notes provided are meant to cover the rough contours of contract theory. Much of<br/>their substance is borrowed heavily from the lectures and notes of Mathias Dewatripont,<br/>Bob Gibbons, Oliver Hart, Serge Moresi, Klaus Schmidt, Jean Tirole, and Je Zwiebel. In<br/>addition, helpful, detailed comments and suggestions were provided by Rohan Ptichford,<br/>Adriano Rampini, David Roth, Jennifer Wu and especially by Daivd Martimort. I have<br/>relied on many outside published sources for guidance and have tried to indicate the relevant<br/>contributions in the notes where they occur. Financial support for compiling these notes<br/>into their present form was provided by a National Science Foundation Presidential Faculty<br/>Fellowship and a Sloan Foundation Fellowship. I see the purpose of these notes as (i) to<br/>standardize the notation and approaches across the many papers in the eld, (ii), to present<br/>the results of later papers building upon the theorems of earlier papers, and (iii) in a few<br/>cases present my own intuition and alternative approaches when I think it adds something<br/>to the presentation of the original author(s) and di ers from the standard paradigm. Please<br/>feel free to distribute these notes in their entirety if you wish to do so.</font></p>
<p><font face="Verdana">c 1996, Lars A. Stole.</font></p>
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